"The Shotgun Marriage: Managing Eurosceptical Opinion in British Political Parties 1972-2002" by Baker, David









Paper for the Panel:

"Scepticism in European Party Politics" 

Chair and Discussant: 
Steven Wolinetz (Memorial University Newfoundland)


















There is no logical reason why a single party should not be an amalgam of factions, tendencies, single‑issue groups and non‑aligned politicians and activists, and no reason why a mixture of ideological, power‑seeking and material motivations should not underlie this blend. (Paul Webb, 2001, p. )

Hague spoke well. “Time to move on” was the theme: on from squabbles over Europe. He said “time to move on” 19 times. Spotlit behind the glass of a television studio to one side, Michael Heseltine and Normon Lamont were not moving on.... They were giving live television interviews - on Europe. On the conference floor Tory representatives whispered excitedly - about Europe. Up the corridor in the media room, journalists typed columns - about Europe. (The Times, 7/10/98)


In party management terms Europe represents a clear case of an uncomfortable political ‘shotgun marriage’, in the sense that UK party leaders and their managers have to deal with an evolving, highly controversial, and largely externally driven policy agenda, whilst operating an internal system of party discipline predicated on a set of largely predictable and negotiable (or at least enforceable) domestic agendas. ​[1]​

The very nature of the evolving European integration process involves the pooling (and therefore in one sense ‘loss’) of national sovereignty, with constant tension between evolving supranationalist and inter-governmentalist agendas, plus an ongoing debate on the degree of marketisation verses social protection this process has (and should) entail. Together this makes party management through the ‘usual Parliamentary channels’ – represented by an injudicious mixture of threats, bribes and appeals to party unity - a nightmare compared to most other policy areas.  (Baker et al, 1993a, 1993b, 1994)

Intra-Party conflict over European integration was once seen by political scientists as most damaging to Labour, however, the Conservative party has a long history of division over Europe. Skillful party management in the 1960s, and Labour rebels in the 1970s, enabled Conservative leaders to conduct negotiations to join the EEC while marginalising their own dissidents in Parliament. As a result the issue received relatively little detailed academic attention, apart from Ashford’s study of the 1945-75 period concluded that the European issue required the Conservative party to be viewed more as a managed coalition than as a stable hierarchy. [Ashford, 1980, p. 123-24]

British political parties place enormous weight on unity and much parliamentary dissidence, especially in the Conservative Party, tends to be single issue and short-lived in character. The rules of the parliamentary game, as played by most MPs, are loyal support for the government no matter what the private beliefs of the individual MPs, an attitude summed up in a phrase attributed to Clemenceau: "a speech may often change my mind; my vote never". 

The very procedures of parliament institutionalise strong single party government. Consequently, in spite of deep and enduring internal disagreements, the Conservative Party has only suffered two major splits in the last 149 years.​[2]​ And unlike both the Liberals and Labour, the Conservatives have never split on purely domestic issues. 

The cohesion of UK parliamentary parties is widely acknowledged as in decline in recent decades (Norton 1975; 1978; 1980; 1994a; Norton and Cowley 1996).  Indeed, aside from New Labour’s recent period of unprecedented ‘on message’ unity (recent Iraq War dissent accepted), it has been Labour which has traditionally displayed internal disagreements and problems on the surface. (Haseler 1969; Jenkins 1979; Seyd 1987). 

Norton identifies three broad periods of intra-party behaviour since 1945. A long period of 'quiescence' lasting until 1970, marked by extremely high levels of cohesion and discipline enforced via party channels and whips. The 1970s saw 'sudden and unprecedented growth in [Commons] cross‑voting' with a number of gov​ernment defeats inflicted by backbench rebellions. Finally, a post‑79 'water​shed' occurred after which formal party structures of discipline and constraint proved largely ineffective (1975; 1990a). 

Such open dissent is generally agreed to have inflicted severe electoral damage on Labour twice since 1945, first after 1951, and again in the late 1970s and early 1980s and contributed powerfully to the post-war long term electoral dominance of Conservatism. (Kogan and Kogan 1982; Curtice and Semetko 1994; Heath and Jowell 1994). 





The Bagehotian tradition assumed high level of party discipline within parliament, with subservient parliamentary parties responding to the dictates of party elites. A classic example of a reactive legislature, rather than an active one as with the US Congress, which is armed with extensive countervailing powers to introduce legislation (Mezey 1979: 36). However, as backbench rebellions have grown in size and number Anthony King's view that, governments can no longer simply ‘shrug off attacks from its own backbenchers' has become common currency of academic discussions of UK politics (King 1976a: 214). Those wishing to illustrate the potential power of the parliamentary party often cite their devastating effect upon Margaret Thatcher’s prospects as Tory leader and therefore Prime Minister in 1991. (Kavanagh and Seldon, 1996)

A more sophisticated perspective is to suggest that that backbench countervailing power varies across time and different policy arenas. Thus, on issues such as foreign and defence policy, and macro economic matters, the sheer complexity of the brief and the presence behind the scenes of powerful departments of state that administer them, removes such issues from backbench scrutiny, while in social affairs – especially crime, health and education, backbenchers are often both active and vocal in their criticism of their own party and government. (Brand:  1992.) But there exists no iron law of policy competencies, illustrated by the fact that Wilson refused Lyndon Johnson's request to deploy British troops into Vietnam in 1967, at least partly because he recognized that his party would not accept direct military involvement in such a remote conflict. (Pimlott, 1993) Equally any  government with a small parliamentary majority, such as Callaghan’s in the late 1970s and Major’s 1992-1997 administration, are, potentially at least, highly vulnerable to backbench rebellions tipping them into minority status. 

Four principle forms of, organizational behavioural and ideological intra‑party groupings are discernable in the literature, namely: ‘faction’; ‘tendency’; ‘non‑aligned’ (Rose's 1964), and ‘single‑issue alliance’ (Hine; 1982).​[3]​ Rose argued that a factions are marked by four core defining features: self‑consciousness; persistence through time; a wide spectrum of policy proposals; a significant degree of organizational infrastructure, with a recognizable leadership, officers, and network of communications. As such a faction can approach ‘a party within a party’ as with the Militant Tendency inside Old Labour. (Shaw, 1994)

A ‘tendency’, by contrast, is less organized and cohesive: 'a stable set of attitudes, not a stable set of politicians' (Rose, op. cit.: 37). Individuals shift from one tendency to another according to particular issue preferences. Any party divided into tendencies as opposed to factions, will lack distinctive lines of intra‑party alignment. Non alignment  refers to those ‘party loyalists’ (Norton, 1990) who sway with the parliamentary/electoral wind and, depending on the circumstances may, or may not, support their leadership’s line. Finally, a ‘single‑issue alliance’ concentrates on a single policy issue, and does not follow the predictable lines of intra‑party alignment, and is much more limited both in scope and duration.

Writing in the mid 1960s Rose concluded that the Conservative Party was 'pre‑eminently a party of tendencies' – based upon common causes of 'reaction', 'status quo', 'amelioration and reform'. Labour, on the other hand, had always been a party of factions - a left‑wing faction and a less cohesive although persistent social democratic right faction, seen at work during the 1950s 'Campaign for Democratic Socialism' [Rose, 1964: 40‑1; Haseler 1969]). But in partial contradiction to this Brand argued that most Labour and Conservative MPs remained in tendencies rather than factions until 1983, after which the party divided into three reasonably distinct groupings, two on the left and one on the right. He also identified two factions among Conservative MPs, one based around the a right‑wing 92 Group and a very small left‑wing group associated with the ‘Lollards’. [J. Brand: 1989]. Norton’s later typology of the Conservatives whilst ignoring any distinctions between factions and tendencies, did identify a 'party faithful' group (1990: 55).

If anything illustrates the changes over time it has to be the fact that Rose’s assumption (see also Hatfield 1978; Kogan and Kogan 1982 ) that Labour is the party of both factions and tendencies appears odd today, in the era of New Labour characterised above all by its ‘on message’ discipline and cohesion. However, the rebellion of around a third of the parliamentary party over war with Iraq has revived images of the traditional Labour factionalism, although there is plenty of evidence that this is really a case of a ‘single‑issue (moral anti-war) alliance’ with elements of left wing factionalism within it.​[4]​ 

But the most important element of this form of conceptiualisation is that while internal party groups may have self‑serving motives, nevertheless such groups invariably cluster around deeply held convictions and ideological motivations, and it is this which makes for the non-negotiable nature of intra party conflict. 

Nor can there be any doubt over which ideological issue (or cluster of related concerns) has consistently inspired British parliamentarians to defy intense pressure from the party managers and whips to toe the united party line over the last 30 years – it is that of European Union. It is this issue above all which has provided the solid basis of UK Party factionalism since 1972. Labour provided the front running in the early years, but by the early 1990s the Conservative Party suffered the most with anti-European parliamentary Eurosceptic factions such as the Bruges and Fresh Start groups, and the No Turning Back and European Foundation. These groups were  opposed by pro-Europeans in the party organised around (amongst others) the Positive European and Action Centre for Europe groups. (Baker2001, 2002). And, while displaying many elements of single‑issue groups, they have threatened to transform themselves into enduring factions. This has led Paul Webb to speculate that: 






Labour – From Hostility to ‘Constructive Engagement’

Labour's history of division and U‑turns in official policy with regard to the UK’s relationship to the process of European integration has been well researched. (Forster 2002; Ludlam and Smith 2000; Baker and Seawright, 1988.) Prior to the late 1980s, the majority of the PLP, party membership and affiliated trade unions opposed membership. The EC was portrayed as a capitalist and big farmers ‘ramp'. The CAP was depicted a plot to increase in food prices, and distort Britain's ‘natural’ trading patterns, with the Commonwealth, Europe also threatened the parliamentary sovereignty which had allowed Atlee to instigate the Welfare and interventionist states. (Newman 1983, Robins 1979).

As with the Tories, the Labour leadership was often more favorably inclined towards Europe than their backbenchers, party activists and rank and file membership. It is likely that Harold Wilson would have accepted the terms that Heath negotiated for entry in 1971, but pressures within the Labour party forced his public opposition to the EEC in the 1974 election campaigns. The majority of the party was strongly against the terms of entry and this feeling deepened in the years ahead. Wilson sought to head it off by promising to renegotiate the terms of entry and then put these to a referendum. Once back in power in 1974 the Leadership rediscovered its support for membership and the Cabinet supported the hastily 'renegotiated terms' 16 to 7, but a majority of the parliamentary party voted against, with a Special Labour Conference voting 2 to 1 against. Fortunately for the leadership the referendum ended with a 2 to 1 vote in support of the Government.

The Referendum was expected to settle the issue once and for all with membership endorsed by the electorate and by the leaderships of the three main political parties. However, Labour’s ideological fault lines remained visible and intensified. Heath’s parliamentary vote to accept the terms of entry in 1971 had only been passed with the support of 69 Labour MPs, who voted with the Government, and twenty others who abstained. 39 Conservatives voted against and 2 abstained. The Labour supporters of entry included the Deputy Leader, Roy Jenkins. Jenkins went on to play a leading role in the Referendum campaigning for a Yes vote, and subsequently became Chairman of the European Commission. The gulf between the leadership and the bulk of the Labour movement was not bridged by the Referendum and the deep political and economic crisis of the 1970s saw the Labour party moving to the Left and developing the alternative economic strategy, which aimed at guaranteeing employment and welfare through protectionist and interventionist policies, the implementation of which would have required withdrawal from the European Community.

This stance was embodied by the 1983 general election manifesto which called for UK withdrawal from the EC. But a powerful lesson was administered by the electorate in 1993 with 28 per cent of the vote representing Labour’s lowest share since the 1930s, followed by a further crushing defeat in 1987 Inspired by this experience a crucial change towards a pro-European policy emerged under Neil Kinnock as one element of a more comprehensive policy review exercise. 

The pro‑European conversion was also partly due to significant changes in approach to economic policy and the role of the nation‑state in Labour politics. (Daniels 1998). In particular Labour strategists began to view the EC as a possible vehicle for interventionist resistance to Thatcherite free market policies which were now viewed as unsustainable in a purely national context. (Anderson and Mann 1997; Callaghan 2000). In addition crucial tactical and ideological changes in elite trade union positions towards Europe too place. (Rosamond, 1998) 

Old Labour strategists had traditionally viewed the nation‑state as an effective vehicle in securing its redistributive political objectives, until 18 years of continuous radical free-market Tory government undermined this belief in the social-democratic efficacy Britain's constitutional apparatus. The resulting programme of Blair’s domestic constitutional reform agenda, included the necessity of pooling of national sovereignties with international partners ‑ in particular the EC. (Tindale 1992:).

The changing nature and pace of European integration also played a vital role. Following the Single European Act (SEA) and single market programme in 1985 and 1988 the EC developed a 'social dimension' and affiliated trade unions became increasingly involved in Pan‑European union confederations as a method of improving their bargaining power within the EU policy arena, strongly Influenced by the belief that they could win back at the European level employment rights removed by the Thatcher governments. Labour also viewed the EC as an apparatus through which a basic framework for protecting fundamental rights and non‑discrimination provisions. (Tindale 1992: Rosamund,1998).

Labour's pro‑European conversion was soon embodied in a much closer relationship with its sister social democratic parties across the EC. This led to the adoption of joint socialist manifestos for the 1984 and 1989 EP elections. And the establishment of the umbrella Party of European Socialists (PES) in 1992, provided proper policy coordination and joint organisation. National party leaders met more often and more formally than before – in particular on the eve of the European Council. And PES elite working‑groups were created in various policy areas, facilitating the adoption of joint party leadership declarations. MEPs across the PES parties coalesced into the PES parliamentary group where their return in large numbers at the 1989 and 1994 European elections allowed Labour MEPs to exercise considerable power. (Hix 1999, Ladrech 2000).

By the early 1990s, Labour was in the PES social democratic mainstream, seeking to ensure:

…that international economic success for some is not bought with monopolistic practices, or at the price of a ruined environment, or an exploited workforce, or at the expense of those regions and people less able to fend for themselves . . . so that Europe moves in the direction that [it’s ordinary citizens] want and not solely in the direction determined by international commercial forces' (Labour Party 1993b).

Labour also supported participation in a strengthened social chapter and endorsed more qualified majority voting (QMV) in areas such as social and environmental policy in order to ensure the same effectiveness of policy development in these areas that this institutional change had facilitated in relation to the single market programme (Labour Party 1994).

In terms of macro-economic policy Labour now advocated a neo-Keynesian strategy at the European level, advocating an EU wide counter‑cyclical growth and employment strategy - expanding the lending facility of the European Investment Bank to finance infrastructure investment, to so undermining the national borrowing limits for by EMU convergence (Labour Party 1993b: 1994:). In the New Agenda for Democracy (1993) policy statement, Labour's domestic constitutional reform programme was overtly linked to the need to democratise the EU’s democratic deficit caused by the failure to match decision‑making transfers to the EU level with accountability transfers and advocated a 'new constitutional settlement' based on the principles of 'subsidiarity, democracy and accountability.' (Labour Party 1993a:, 1993b).

This, combined with an influx of large numbers of shiny new modernizing pro European MPs at the 1997 and 2001 ‘landslide’ election victories, cemented in place a considerable pro-European majority in at the heart of the PLP. (Baker et al, 1999)


Conservatives from Euro-enthusiasm to Destructive Disengagement.

Since the mid 1980s the Conservative party, once Britain's ‘party of Europe’, has been convulsed by divisions over Europe. A succession of cabinet ministers including Mrs. Thatcher, were propelled from office over Europe. The Maastricht backbench rebellion ranked amongst the most damaging ever suffered by the party. Factional activity led Major actually to resign his leadership and stand for re-election mid-term, challenging his critics to 'put up or shut up'. The appearance of Goldsmith's Referendum Party in the 1997 election rekindled open rebelliousness, with a third of Conservative candidates issuing personal manifestos ruling out a single currency. 

Against this an increasingly well organised European lobby issued tactical denials that disillusioned pro-European MPs might defect. With the ‘beef war’ raging between London and Brussels, factors that had previously stood in the way of a catastrophic formal split in the party seemed to be weakening. That they didn’t, was largely due to the fact that in opposition William Hague enforced a Eurosceptical line on his gravely weakened party, gradually marginalising the pro-European wing.

In 1971‑2 Heath navigated the European Communities Bill through the Commons, despite the relatively large number of known sceptics and outright opponents of entry within the Conservative Party and with public opinion polls reflecting popular unhappiness with Britain's terms of entry. In the first reading of the Bill in October 1971, Heath secured 356 against 244 opposed. This vote was secured by a free vote instead of enforcing the party whip. Heath gained support from pro‑entry Labour MPs and Liberals. 69 Labour MPs voted for entry, (20 abstaining) 39 Conservatives voted against, with 2 abstaining. (Butler and Butler, 1994, p. 184) In February 1972, the Bill's second reading was secured by a close 309 to 301 vote, with 15 Conservative noes and 4 abstentions; The Bill passed its third reading in July 1972 with 301 in favour, 284 against (16 Conservative noes and 4 abstentions, and 13 Labour abstentions) and on 1 January 1973 the United Kingdom entered the EC.

Patterns of dissidence in the Commons, measured by votes against the party whip, were studied by Jackson [1968], and then comprehensively by Norton [1977; 1978 & 1980]. Norton used MPs’ voting records and participant observation in his attempt to establish  and assess these levels of dissent in the Conservative Party, concluding that Europe was the divisive issue in the Conservative Party as early as 1970-74. [Norton, 1978 passim] Norton emphasised that the incidence of dissent over the European issue, particularly in the session 1971-72, was without precedent in post-war British parliamentary history, both in terms of the number of divisions with dissenting votes and in the persistent public dissent expressed on the floor of the House. (Norton, 1978:61) The persistent dissension found by Norton in the parliamentary session 1971/72 is stronger for the parliamentary session 1991/92. The former session included 38 members rebelling on one occasion and 36 members between 2 and 9 occasions; but during the Maastricht Bill no less than 53 MPs rebelled once and 117 MPs between 2 and 10 times. 

Norton’s findings also revealed that no more than 9 Tory MPs were willing to oppose their government in the  1971/1972 session on more than 59 occasions. Yet on the same number of occasions (59) during the European Communities Amendment Bill, between the 21 May 1992 and the 20 May 1993, an average of 19 Conservative Members opposed their government on this issue alone. Also, in ten of those incidences we find only one or two MPs opposing the ‘Maastricht Bill’, mostly Bill Cash or Sir Teddy Taylor. If these incidences are not considered, the average Conservative ‘dissent’ on just this Bill rises to 22 Members in each division for the 1991/92 session, compared to Norton’s 10 MPs. Moreover, Norton (ibid.: 66) highlights the fact that 44 Conservatives registered their disapproval against entry to Europe in an Early Day Motion (EDM) on the 23 July 1970. However, on 3 June 1992 no less than 84 Tory MPs signed the ‘Fresh Start’ Early day Motion which called for the government to grasp the opportunity afforded it by the Danish Referendum which effectively suspended Maastricht to renegotiate Britain’s position vis-à-vis Europe.

The reason behind this was the fact that the pace of European integration accelerated and deepened after 1988 gradually revealing the underlying tensions which have always existed between market modernisers and libertarian ultra-nationalists in the Tory party. Both these traditions lie, in varying degrees, at the ideological centre of British Conservatism. 

This process occurred gradually over time because European integration, especially prior to Maastricht, did not obviously represented a tangible threat to the old style sovereignty of the nation‑state, and the relatively limited degree of pooling of national sovereignty was accepted largely in terms of creating a forwards looking and efficient market-based liberal society which appeased and tempted both to One nation Conservative modernisers and ultra-nationalist market liberals. But once faced with a stark and seemingly mutually exclusive choice between defending national sovereignty or pursuing joint European economic modernisation in an era of global capitalism, individual Conservative Ps were compelled to take sides and preference either one position or the other. In addition this represented a crucial decision affecting the long term shape and direction of British political economy and the nature of the British state. (Baker et al 2002)

Therefore Conservative leaders only faced the full force of intra-party dissent as the Treaty on European Union (TEU) emerged at the top of Europe’s political agenda in the early 1990s. The ideological disagreement became so brutal that the Major government's attempts to ratify the treaty generated several entirely new pro- and anti‑European ginger groups in parliament. And with New Labour unexpectedly united on European matters, a number of parliamentary defeats were inflicted on the Major governments including crucial amendments to the Council of Regions and Social Chapter, culminating with the temporary removal of the whip from eight intransigent backbench Eurosceptic rebels in November 1994, leaving the Major administration in a minority position in the Commons. (Baker et al, Cowley, Norton.) 

These divisions did not disappearand in fact strengthened to play an important role in undermining the Party’s image of unity in the run-up to the disastrous 1997 election.  However, since moving into opposition in 1997 under Hague and then Iain Duncan-Smith the parliamentary party has become a relatively united anti‑European, right‑wing, ultra-nationalist/ market-libertarian party. The broadly Eurosceptic to Europhobic attitudinal profile of the parliamentary party under Duncan-Smith, derives predominantly from the orthodox die hard nationalist and ultra-libertarian right. Meanwhile pro-European Tories are represented within the party both by pro‑European and the more traditional center-right party groupings, including the Tory Reform Group and One‑Nation Forum. (Webb 1997: 103‑4).






Conclusions: Party Management on Europe: Changing Circumstances. 

Much of UK party management over Europe has been less about the issue itself and more about holding divided governing parties together in the face of the necessity to do deals with our European partners, or in the run up to electoral contests which necessitate an appearance, at least, of party unity. 

Wilson’s handling of the renegotiations in 1974-75 was a classic case of muddling through and canny maneuverings. His initial aim was to use the issue for advantage over the Conservatives in the 1974 elections. Indeed Wilson’s famous ‘zig-zags’ on Europe (no in 1962, qualified yes in 1966, no in 1971, yes again in 1975) were largely motivated by whether the party was in or out of power at the time, and to keep his party (and not just over European issue) united. The 1975 Referendum was also principally designed to keep his, by the, deeply factionalised party from splitting.

Likewise Major’s chief strategy during the political rapids leading to the Maastricht Bill was to hold the Conservative party together and prevent it from splitting, both by fudging the issues wherever possible, and by threatening to resign where this failed (tactics reminiscent of Heath’s in the early 1970s). (Baker et al 1993a; 1994)

Another tactic has been the series of  headline grabbing ‘renegotiations’ of the terms, and high profile ‘opt outs’ from, EC/EU agreements (by Wilson, Thatcher, Major and Blair). For the main part all were largely cosmetic attempts to convince the party in power’s rank and file activists and parliamentarians that the leadership was tough on Europe and guarding ‘British interests’.  

Major’s triumphant ‘opt-outs’ from the Social Chapter (SC) and Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) negotiated at Maastricht were chiefly designed to hold his deeply divided party together, by appeasing the Eurosceptics without alarming the Europhiles. Nevertheless, the Tory Eurosceptics were alarmed by this, since it gave renewed prominence to the dangers of the integration process which had necessitated the opt-outs in the first place. (Baker and Seawright 1998)

But while party managers in the two governing parties have had severe problems in disciplining their MPs at crucial Euro-moments, the party system itself has weakened the scope for protest and disruption by the rebels.

The monolithic UK party system offers little viable alternative party political vehicles for most rebellious MPs, who must face the prospect of an election and replacement by the opposition if they place their beliefs above their party in crucial votes. The 'iron law of back‑bench rebellions', attributed to Harold Wilson, states that the maximum number of rebels in any Commons vote of confidence  is one less than the number needed to wipe out the government's majority. [Economist 31/10/92] As Anthony Forster has put it:

For over fifty years MPs have been willing to defy their party managers and Parliament, and to vote with the opposition on European issues. At the same time, however, for most MPs there has been an unwillingness to forsake their political party in pursuit of the European issue. Indeed, most sceptics have been willing to accept government posts and have been reluctant to resign from government office when they have found themselves opposing government policy…even in John Major’s divided government of 1992 to 1997, only John Redwood resigned his Cabinet post to fight the prime Minister for the leadership of the Conservative party, with David Davis and David Heathcote-Amery the only junior minister to resign, and James Cran standing down as a PPS. Only in a handful of cases has the issue been more important than a commitment to a political party. (Forster, 2002, p 142.)

Successful Party management over Europe has also been as dependant upon the strength and unity of the opposition, and on electoral calculations of comparative advantage, as upon threats and inducements from senior whips and managers of the governing party, This could be seen in 1972 when the Labour Party was seriously divided over Europe, and ‘anti-Marketeer’ Conservatives were exhorted to preserve party unity in order to maximise the Conservative party’s electoral advantage on the issue. 

Also, whenever electoral considerations and whip’s pressure failed to discipline his rebels in 1971 Edward Heath could still rely on dissenting Labour votes to ensure a majority and as a result he never lost a vote on Europe. In contrast, John Major had to face a disciplined pro-European New Labour opposition, just as his essential electoral pact with Unionist MPs had become unreliable in the face of his discussions with Sinn  Fein over Ulster. In such changed circumstances calls by Major’s or Hague’s party managers to unite behind a pro-European policy in order to defeat Labour were easily rebuffed by latter-day Euro-rebels.

It is also noticeable that in both 1972 and 1993 Conservative governments had relatively small majorities, making threats to withdraw the whip from rebels largely empty. Events in the post-Maastricht era underlined this point with 8 Conservatives losing the whip and one voluntarily relinquishing it, so plunging the government in crisis, without any major effect on their dissent. Small parliamentary majorities can empower vociferous dissenting factions with little to lose by placing the party in opposition, especially if they occupy safe seats.  

One should never discount the importance of the political base of individual MPs at times of high dissent over Europe. Many hard-core rebels occupied relatively safe seats in the early 1990s. Of those rebelling on the Maastricht Paving Motion or Amendment 28, three-quarters enjoyed majorities of over 10 percent, more than half of over 20%. [See Norton, 1978: p188-89]

Major’s European management strategy, and the problems he encountered in the process, were best summed up by him in off-the-cuff remarks he made to an ITV journalist, which were inadvertently recorded for posterity and later leaked to the public domain:

‘The real problem is one of a tiny majority. Don’t overlook that I could have all these clever decisive things which people wanted me to do - but I would have split the Conservative party into smithereens. And you would have said I acted like a ham-fisted leader. Just think it through from my perspective. You are the Prime Minister with a majority of 18, a party that is harking back to a golden age that never was, and is now invented. You have three right-wing members of the Cabinet who actually resign. What happens in the parliamentary Party?...I could bring in other people. But where do you think most of this poison is coming from? From the dispossessed and the never-possessed. You can think of ex-ministers who are going round causing all sorts of trouble. We don’t want another three more of the bastards out there.’ [27th July, 1993]


But this may cut both ways. Berrington and Hague point to the accumulated frustrations of a party which has been in power for too long, as in the 1979-92 period, by the end of which thwarted Backbench and Frontbench ambitions lead to acute resentment and frustration amongst some ambitious individuals. They factor this into Mrs. Thatcher’s fall over the Poll tax and Europe and the Maastrict rebellion therefore becomes, in part, ‘the revolt of the dispossessed and the ‘hunger of the never possessed’, creating new and powerful party management problems for both Thatcher and Major over Europe. (Berrington and Hague, 1998, pp. 65-66)

Ashford study of the 1945-75 period concluded:

The traditional view of the Conservative party has been hierarchical one where the initiative lies with the leader and other members of the party follow his lead…. The success in getting the party to support Community membership has been attributed to the tremendous powers of the leader and their use by Harold Macmillan and Edward heath. Whilst not rejecting the importance of the role of the leader, it may be more useful to view the party as a collection of  interest and attitude groups, which the leader seeks to unite behind his policies. The support of all the various groups within the party cannot be assumed but must be sought and wooed, although there may be a reserve of loyalty which the leader may draw upon…this the traditional hierarchical view of the Conservative party may need to be revised towards a more complex group-based analysis….’ (Ashford, 1980, p. p. 123-24) 
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^1	  Since I started this paper I have read a very interesting article by Simon Usherwood, ‘Opposition to the European Union in the UK: The dilemma of public opinion and party management’, Government and Opposition, Vol.37‑2, pp.211‑230 Sadly I discovered it too late to incorporate it’s findings here but I recommend it as an insightful addition to the recent literature in the field.
^2	   Splits need to be distinguished from divisions. Only occasionally will division of opinion in a party become a split, in which there is a formal breakaway by a substantial group, followed by the establishment of a new party or an alliance with an existing one.  [Baker, et al, 1993c]
^3	  Hine's definition of a tendency is 'a group which displays a broad position upon some ideological or value‑based continuum (e.g., left, centrist, right) but which lacks clearly defined membership, leadership or discipline, and makes few attempts to coordinate activities or extend itself throughout all levels of party organization' (1982: 12).
^4	  In fact 99 of Labour's 122 Iraq rebels on the first vote had rebelled at least once since 1997. See Philip Cowley, Revolts and Rebellions: Parliamentary Voting Under Blair. 2002
